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This commentary discusses common relevant themes that have been highlighted
across contributions in this special issue on “Creativity Assessment: Pitfalls, Solutions,
and Standards.” We first highlight the challenges of operationalizing creativity through
the use of a range of measurement approaches that are simply not tapping into the
same aspect of creativity. We then discuss pitfalls and challenges of the three most
popular measurement methods employed in the field, namely divergent thinking tasks,
productbased assessment using the consensual assessment techniques, and selfreport methodology. Finally, we point to two imperative standards that emerged across
contributions in this collection of articles, namely transparency (need to accurately
define, operationalize, and report on the specific aspect[s] of creativity studied) and
homogenization of creativity assessment (identification and consistent use of an optimal
“standard” measure for each major aspect of creativity). We conclude by providing
directions on how the creativity research community and the field can meet these
standards.
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The question of creativity measurement has often been at the forefront of the
creativity research agenda (Plucker & Runco, 1998) since the beginning of the
systematic study of individual differences in creativity, tracing back to over a century
ago (e.g., Binet, 1900; Galton, 1869). Although some measurement methods have long
been described as “gold standards” for creativity assessment— such as the Torrance
Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1998) or the Consensual Assessment
Technique (CAT; Amabile, 1982)—persistent criticisms (e.g., Baer, 2011), evolving
research needs (e.g., neuroscience paradigms; Benedek, Christensen, Fink, & Beaty,
2019), and efforts to address measurement challenges (e.g., Reiter-Palmon,
Forthmann, & Barbot, 2019) have led to a plethora of alternative approaches to classic
measurement methods and, in turn, a lack of set standards in creativity assessment.
This lack of standards, together with enduring conceptual and methodological issues,
greatly challenges the external validity of creativity studies, limits meta-analytical work,
and makes the concept of creativity elusive to the novice eye.

This special issue provides a much-needed critical review of current practice in
creativity assessment and existing measures, outlining common pitfalls while
suggesting important guidelines and standards for best practice in creativity research
and directions for the field. Such an endeavor is timely because we seem to be at an
important pivotal point in the history of both creativity research and assessment. On the
one hand, the increasing awareness of creativity as a relevant concept that can be
measured and nurtured is evident from large-scale initiatives putting more than ever
creativity “on the map.” These initiatives include the Partnership for 21st Century
Learning (P21; Partnership for 21st Century Skills, 2008) and the inclusion of creative
thinking as part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)1 2021 program that, if moving
forward, will assess half a million 15-year-old students worldwide. On the other hand,
there is generally a continued interest in assessment issues (Plucker & Makel, 2010;
Vartanian et al., 2019), which transpires from the increasing number of publications in
(and submissions to) creativity research outlets. Indeed, although methods have not
really changed for decades, as illustrated by Snyder, Hammond, Grohman, &
KatzBuonincontro’s (2019) review and Glaveanu’s (2019) analysis, the field is now
evolving rapidly. These changes are triggered notably through inputs from the
neuroscience of creativity (Benedek, Christensen, Fink, & Beaty, 2019), the emergence
of digital assessments and new assessment paradigms (Barbot, 2018b; Hass, 2017;
Loesche, Goslin, & Bugmann, 2018), and new statistical development and approaches
(e.g., Fürst, 2018; Myszkowski & Storme, 2019; Primi, Silvia, Jauk, & Benedek, 2019).
These developments have provided new solutions and interpretations to enduring
measurement problems (e.g., Forthmann, Szardenings, & Holling, 2018; Hornberg &
Reiter-Palmon, 2017) and spurred renewed interest in the dynamization of creativity
assessments (e.g., Jankowska, Czerwonka, Lebuda, & Karwowski, 2018). This is, in
sum, an exciting time for creativity assessment, and this collection of articles provides a
good snapshot of why it is so.

Which Creativity Construct Are We Measuring?
A Taxonomy of Creativity Assessment
In a recent commentary, Rossiter (2018) posited that “psychology— just as is
standard practice in the physical sciences—needs to agree on an optimal standard
measure of each major construct” (p. 931). Although creativity certainly qualifies as
such a major construct, this noble objective might be unrealistic in our field. It is not that
creativity researchers cannot agree in general. They have overall agreed on a standard,
or general definition, of creativity. However, despite this consensus, the way creativity is
operationalized from study to study greatly varies. The problem lies mainly in the
broadness of the construct and the range of behaviors that are referred to by the
1 http://www.oecd.org/pisa/.

generic term creativity. Reaching consensus on an optimal standard measure of any
psychological construct may work for relatively unified (i.e., unidimensional, and
domaingeneral) and/or narrow (e.g., life-satisfaction) constructs but not for broad,
multidimensional, and partly domain-specific phenomena such as creativity. In practice,
there are many ways to operationalize creativity, but different creativity measures
cannot be used interchangeably (e.g., Glaveanu, 2019; Hornberg & ReiterPalmon,
2017; Sternberg, 2018), because they all tap into distinct aspects of the phenomenon.
An illustrative parallel can be made with the construct of intelligence. Interpreted
in a broad sense (as reflected in psychometric batteries of intelligence), working
memory is viewed as a facet of the construct of intelligence. However, it would seem
plain wrong to use a working memory task to conclude on intelligence as a whole. In the
realm of creativity measurement, this level of distinction is often violated: Divergent
thinking (DT) as well as product-based measures—tasks leading to a creative
production that is then generally rated by external observers—are routinely employed
as proxy for “generic” creativity. This is strikingly evident from Snyder, Hammond,
Grohman, & Katz-Buonincontro (2019)’s review of 446 studies of creativity spanning
three decades, indicating the prevalence of the term creativity regardless of the
operationalization of the construct. Unfortunately, generalization to the broader
construct (creativity) is even less justified than in this context of intelligence research,
given that creativity appears even less unitary than does intelligence. This is supported
by mounting evidence showing limited domain-generality of creative performance
across product-based tasks (e.g., Barbot, 2018a; Barbot, Besançon, & Lubart, 2016),
across tasks within the same domain of activity (e.g., Baer, 2011), and even across
alternate forms of the same task (Reiter-Palmon, Forthmann, & Barbot, 2019).
In sum, it can fairly be stated that there is no single measure of creativity per se.
Across several articles in this collection, a plea for a more accurate identification of the
(sub)construct being measured by specific tasks is emphasized (e.g., Acar & Runco,
2019; Barbot, 2019; Kaufman, 2019; Reiter-Palmon, Forthmann, & Barbot, 2019). This
point is not trivial: It outlines a need to be more attentive to the use of the creativity
vocabulary, by accurately reporting on which “creativity” we are referring to in our
studies. We do have the vocabulary and conceptual distinctions to do so, and being
more rigorous on that matter would avoid a view of creativity as a loose or elusive entity.
A greater accuracy in defining the specific aspects of creativity accounted for in a given
study would also increase the accuracy of predictions than can be made about a
particular facet of creativity and facilitate metaanalytic work (Barbot, 2018c):
Inconsistencies in measurement methods are often the greatest moderator of metaanalytic findings on a range of topics, such as the relationship between creativity and
academic achievement (e.g., Gajda, Karwowski, & Beghetto, 2017), self-esteem (Deng
& Zhang, 2011), or creativity training program effectiveness (e.g., Scott, Leritz, &
Mumford, 2004). Last, but not least, researchers should remain aware of crosscultural
differences in the conceptualization of creativity, as well as its relativity vis-a`-vis shifting

definitions, interpretation of task prompts, and even solution space in creative problemsolving tasks (Glaveanu, 2019).
A follow-up question is, then, what are those distinct aspects of creativity, and
how to operationalize them? This question calls for a universally accepted taxonomy of
measures, which the field is decidedly lacking (Batey, 2012). As noted by Snyder and
colleagues (2019), a framework often used as the basis for such a taxonomy is the four
Ps model (Rhodes, 1961). This framework has been used to categorize measures
according to whether they focus on the person, the process, the product, or the press
(i.e., environment). It has helped in structuring recent reviews (SaidMetwaly, Van den
Noortgate, & Kyndt, 2017) and new taxonomies of measures (Batey, 2012), and it offers
a level of specificity that is surely more suitable than having no specificity at all.
Reviewing self-report instruments only, Kaufman (2019) organizes measures based on
their primary focus: activities (i.e., creative participation and achievements), selfevaluation, process, and beliefs. Similarly, Barbot (2019) distinguishes measures of
creative potential, performance, and achievement at the higher level of the taxonomy.
This distinction is quite operational and well grounded historically (e.g., Guilford, 1966).
Specifically, measures of creative potential (Guilford, 1966) capture the key
individual and environmental resources that come into play in the creative work,
including aspects of cognition (e.g., DT, convergent and associative thinking),
personality (e.g., risktaking, Openness to Experience), emotion, or motivation. Although
the distinction between the terms creative potential and creativity has recently been
described as fruitless when it comes to psychological assessment (Silvia, Christensen,
& Cotter, 2016), this distinction avoids common confusion as to what creativity is. It
places various abilities, motivational factors, and personality trait at the same
contributing level (although their individual importance may vary with the task at hand).
Accordingly, if DT tasks are often viewed as measures of creativity (Runco & Acar,
2012), it would seem inadequate to qualify a measure of Openness to Experiences as a
measure of creativity. In fact, they are both contributing factors of creative activity and
as such, can be fairly qualified as measures of creative potential, not creativity.
Indeed, the commonality of creative potential measures is that they tap into very
specific, somewhat separable resources that come into play in creative work. These
resources are numerous, and they all contribute (with often small to moderate individual
effect sizes) to potentially multiplicative effects when optimally combined for a given
creative work (Sternberg & Lubart, 1991).
There is much room for different types of creative abilities. What it takes to make
the inventor, the writer, the artist, and the composer creative may have some
factors in common, but there is much room for variation of pattern of abilities.
(Guilford, 1950; p. 451)
What follows, then, is to identify those resources of the creative potential that constitute
the common ground for performance in any creative endeavor (Barbot, Tan, Randi,

Santa-Donato, & Grigorenko, 2012). A prominent example is DT, as amply represented
in the literature, in this special issue, and later in this article.
Measures of creative performance call upon the whole creative potential as
engaged in a given simulated domain-based context (“product-based” tasks), such as
producing a drawing, a short story, or a musical composition in standardized condition.
Resulting productions are generally rated by external observers using the CAT
(Amabile, 1982) or related techniques well represented in this issue (Cseh & Jeffries,
2019; Glaveanu, 2019; Myszkowski & Storme, 2019; Primi, Silvia, Jauk, & Benedek,
2019) and further discussed later. Consistent with decades of findings, these measures
are more domain-specific, in that they often engage a different combination of domainrelevant resources for the task at hand, including domain-specific knowledge (Barbot,
2018a).
Finally, measures of creative achievements or productivity rely on inventories of
past accomplishments in different domains (whether based on self-report or
historiometric methodology). Mirroring current practice in the field (Snyder, Hammond,
Grohman, & Katz-Buonincontro, 2019), this special issue represents this type of
measures only limitedly (Barbot, 2019; Kaufman, 2019). Although these measures could
arguably be viewed as the highest standards in creativity assessment due to their
objectivity (Simonton, 1999), they also have shortcomings. First, they represent an
aspect of the creativity phenomenon that does not apply to many groups (in particular
children and adolescents, who are at the forefront of creativity research in education).
Second, they may actually not represent a typical sample of behaviors, because
creative achievements result from a number of internal and external factors that are not
always under the control of the test-takers (e.g., individuals may be lacking the
willingness or the opportunity to turn their potential into creative outputs; success of
real-life achievements is mainly determined by external factors). Indeed, “purely
objective criteria, such as numbers of patents of industrial scientists and engineers,
have not served so well probably because they are determined by many irrelevant
circumstances” (Guilford, 1966; p. 189). Third, there are cross-cultural differences in the
value of creative products, and what constitutes a creative contribution can be
drastically different across cultures, contexts, and at different points in time (Glaveanu,
2019).

Main Methods of Creativity Assessment: Challenges and New
Developments
In this section, we further discuss the contributions in this special issue that
address the main methods for creativity assessment (cf. Forgeard & Kaufman, 2016;
Snyder, Hammond, Grohman, & Katz-Buonincontro, 2019): measurement of creative
potential with DT and ideation tasks, product-based assessment with a focus on the
CAT, and self-report methodology.
Divergences in Divergent Thinking Assessment

Not surprisingly, DT tasks remain a popular choice of methodology in creativity
research. In two of the reviews in this special issue (Benedek, Christensen, Fink, &
Beaty, 2019; Snyder, Hammond, Grohman, & Katz-Buonincontro, 2019), DT was shown
to account for over 50% of the methods across a wide range of creativity studies. Acar
and Runco (2019) reiterated the well-known results of validity studies (e.g., Kim, 2006)
illustrating that various forms of DT can predict creative behaviors. On those grounds,
DT seems to be one of the best ways to quickly obtain information about creative
thinking (a central component of creative potential), and there is a growing body of
research illustrating that this can be accomplished in person and through online
platforms (e.g., Hass, 2015). However, there remain issues regarding their scoring
methods, as discussed by Reiter-Palmon and colleagues (2019). They note there are
many “researcher degrees of freedom” affecting choices about scoring methods,
response exclusion, and data cleaning. Barbot (2019) as well as Reiter-Palmon,
Forthmann, & Barbot (2019) also note that there is poor alternate-form reliability for DT,
which is mainly a function of the variety of originality scoring methods. That is, whereas
originality does not correlate well across different forms of DT tasks (e.g., between
alternate-uses performance and consequences performance) or across stimuli used for
a given DT task (e.g., between alternate use of a brick or of a cardboard box), fluency is
more likely to correlate across different forms. This issue of reliability of DT tasks has
long been recognized in the field (Guilford, 1984; Plucker & Runco, 1998), and its
impact for both the generalizability of findings and the study of creative thinking change
and development is increasingly acknowledged (e.g., Barbot, 2019).
What, then, is divergent thinking, and why does it remain attractive to creativity
researchers? First, it represents a basic paradigm to elicit the thinking processes
leading to creative responses from participants, which is of central importance in the
burgeoning area of neuroscience research on creativity. Benedek and colleagues
(2019) emphasize how the field of neuroscience of creativity has adapted the classic DT
paradigm into a more trial-based ideation format (e.g., Vartanian et al., 2019), which
separates DT processes into ideation time, and response-production time, generally
confounded in DT scores. Facilitated by the advent of digital assessments, this
alternative format and related extensions are opening new avenues for both
neuroscience and behavioral research on creative thinking (Barbot, 2018b). Second, its
face validity as an idea generation or brainstorming task cannot be questioned,
especially when becreative instructions are used (e.g., Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, 2014).
As such, it remains a critical paradigm for testing the effects of interventions designed to
augment creative idea generation (e.g., Scott et al., 2004), provided that a number of
safeguards are closely followed, as in any study of creativity change and development
relying on performance-based tasks (Barbot, 2019).
Indeed, it is clear that DT does not represent a unitary cognitive ability central to
the creative process (e.g., Guilford, 1984). If DT were a general cognitive factor, then it
could be argued that predictive validity of all forms of DT instruments should be much
higher than current estimates suggest, as should alternate-forms reliability. As such, the

recommendations of Reiter-Palmon, Forthmann, & Barbot (2019)—that several forms of
DT tasks be used in general DT studies—should be adhered to if one is interested in
drawing broad conclusions about this fundamental dimension of creative potential in
both experimental and individual differences research. Although a comprehensive
assessment of DT would currently require an unreasonable number of tasks to account
for all its possible products and content facets (Guilford, 1984), relying on a range of
tasks and clearly identifying the nature of these DT tasks (e.g., using Guilford’s, 1984,
structure of intellectbased taxonomy) seem to be a reasonable way to achieve greater
coherence in this line of work (Reiter-Palmon, Forthmann, & Barbot, 2019). This
recommendation resonates well with Snyder, Hammond, Grohman, & KatzBuonincontro’s (2019) advice regarding the need to distinguish domain and task
diversity in creativity as well as relying on multimethod and mixed methods.
As always, the metrics for obtaining information from DT responses beyond
fluency are those that will provide the most amount of information vis-a`-vis creative
potential. The articles in this special issue illustrate that there is still no consensus on
the best way to obtain that information. It follows that not only should scoring match
instructions (Reiter-Palmon, Forthmann, & Barbot, 2019) but the choice of scoring
should also match the theoretical aims of the research project, which may be quite
different from study to study and from culture to culture (Glaveanu, 2019). Acar and
Runco (2019) argue that semantic scoring is the way forward in objectively measuring
remoteness in DT responding, but that argument is incomplete. Indeed, latent semantic
analysis (LSA) shows promise for evaluating cognitive mechanisms underpinning some
manifestations of DT (i.e., those relying on semantic classes), but due to the nature of
LSA itself, this approach may not be sufficient for directly assessing creativity or
originality (cf. Acar & Runco, 2014; Forthmann, Oyebade, Ojo, Günther, & Holling,
2018; Hass, 2017). The most obvious illustration of this point is that LSA may prove
unusable in scoring figural DT tasks (e.g., repeated-figures or incomplete-figures tasks),
whereas much DT production (and creative thinking in general) is indeed not
necessarily processing semantic content (e.g., visual, auditory, symbolic).
Substantial progress is also being made with regard to scoring using the wellworn uniqueness method tied to the statistical frequency of responses. Olteteanu, Hass,
and Zunjani (2018) initiated the construction of a set of normative responses for 420
objects that can be used as prompts in the alternate-uses task. They used a computer
algorithm for clustering similar responses that has the potential to limit the researcher’s
degrees of freedom involved in grouping similar responses together, for both flexibility
and various kinds of originality scoring. These kinds of norming efforts have potential to
support a greater consensus, at least at the prescoring stage (i.e., categorization of
response, determination of their adequacy) and may surely provide more reliable
flexibility scores across different studies.
Product-Based Assessment: How to Skin a CAT?

Since Amabile (1982) proposed the CAT almost four decades ago, the use of this
approach as a way to evaluate and measure creative performance in a wide variety of
product-based tasks has increased, making it one of the most common ways to assess
it. This is evident from the solid upward trend in the use of productbased assessment
suggested by Snyder, Hammond, Grohman, & Katz-Buonincontro’s (2019) review.
Beyond the range of tasks that could lead people to generate creative outputs, the core
of product-based assessment lies in the way they are then scored for their creative
quality. This approach was already common in creativity research prior to Amabile’s
contribution, but the formalization of the CAT has further established its legitimacy.
Several articles in the special issue directly discuss the CAT approach (Cseh and
Jeffries, 2019; Glaveanu, 2019; Myszkowski & Storme, 2019). Cseh and Jeffries (2019)
cover what we know about the CAT from these last 35 years of research. More
important, their article focuses on the inconsistent ways in which this approach has
been used and operationalized in practice. They discuss the potential effects of these
different operationalizations on the integrity of results, and they suggest that these may
be quite impactful. Given that judges or raters are critical to this approach,
understanding who they are and what their level of expertise is, is also important.
Further, Cseh and Jeffries also address issues related to rating scales used, how
productions are presented, and variations in the evaluation of interrater reliability.
Following on this latter issue, Myszkowski and Storme (2019) challenge the classic test
theory paradigm in aggregating information from raters and suggest an alternative way
to evaluate the CAT’s interrater reliability that is based on item response theory (IRT)
under a framework that they coined judge response theory. They argue that this
approach is a more appropriate and accurate way to evaluate interrater reliability,
notably because it can attach a distinct level of reliability to productions of a distinct
level of rated creativity. Indeed, much of the creativity research employing that CAT
reports Cronbach’s alpha as an index of interrater reliability (Cseh & Jeffries, 2019).
However, there are longstanding disagreements as to whether this is the appropriate
index for assessing interrater reliability. More important, Myszkowski and Storme (2019)
emphasize how IRT-based scoring can lead to a more accurate estimation of the latent
trait (i.e., the creative “value” of the rated productions), which greatly questions common
practices regarding the aggregation of ratings.
Supported by the empirical demonstration of Primi, Silvia, Jauk, & Benedek
(2019), Myszkowski and Storme (2019) also draw an appealing picture of what productbased assessment could look like in future creative performance research. This
includes the parsimonious selection of complementary (rather than redundant) raters,
which can be different according to the information already available for a given
production. Both Myszkowski and Storme’s proof of concept and Primi et al.’s empirical
illustrations are demonstrating the flexibility of the IRT frameworks to actually
accommodate most of the variations in the use of the CAT outlined by Cseh and Jeffries
(2019). Indeed, one can easily imagine larger scale studies relying on product-based
tasks that make use of raters of various levels of expertise, rating different productions

(both in quantity and quality), and using rating scales that are not necessarily uniform.
This flexibility could fundamentally reshape the way we use the CAT. Further,
understanding “differences in individual judgment as a psychological process”
(Myszkowski & Storme, 2019) appears particularly appealing to address some of the
challenges outlined by Glaveanu (2019) regarding intercultural CAT research.
Together, what is clear from these articles is that although many researchers use
what they term CAT, the application of this approach is not universal. There are
important questions regarding the use and application of the CAT, which will impact not
only the individual choices of researchers but also of the entire creativity research
community. Although the prospects offered by Myszkowski and Storme (2019) as well
as Primi, Silvia, Jauk, & Benedek (2019) are appealing, it is also clear that more studies
and new approaches are needed to directly evaluate the utility and feasibility of the CAT
under certain conditions. The research community has started to address these issues
(see e.g., work on expert vs. nonexpert raters), but more research is needed to confirm
that these new approaches are worth the effort with respect to the validity of creative
performance scores obtained, as well as with regard to potential issues of
implementation (e.g., statistical packages available to extract IRT-based scores;
logistics of complex rating designs).
Bringing Back the Self in Self-Report Methodologies
Self-report methodology has received surprisingly positive praise in this special
issue (e.g., Barbot, 2019; Cotter & Silvia, 2019; Kaufman, 2019; Karwowski, Han, &
Beghetto, 2019) and remains a popular way to assess aspects of creativity as identified
by Snyder, Hammond, Grohman, & Katz-Buonincontro (2019) and closely reviewed by
Kaufman (2019)—in particular, variables of potential and achievement activities). This
contrasts with typical criticisms from the field of creativity (e.g., “All self-report measures
are somewhat suspect and perhaps especially so in the area of creativity” Baer, 2011;
p. 310). The general shortcoming of self-report instruments may be mainly attributed to
how researchers make inferences from this methodology (Spector, 1994). If we intend
to measure “generic creativity” using the sole reliance on test-takers’ perceptions of
their own creative abilities through self-report measures, then we are surely missing the
point: It is established that people are usually inaccurate in assessing their own
creativity (i.e., self-rated creativity; Reiter-Palmon, RobinsonMorral, Kaufman, & Santo,
2012). However, despite evident limitations of this methodology in creativity research
(for a review, see McKibben & Silvia, 2017), there are some constructs relevant to
creativity that are thus far best measured with self-report methodology because they
precisely tap into people’s own subjectivity and perceptions (Kaufman, 2019).
Of course, self-report methodology has been the preferred approach to capture
aspects of creative personality and motivation, and it is probably the only way that
people can report on their day-to-day creative accomplishment and/or participation in
creative endeavors (Cotter & Silvia, 2019; Kaufman, 2019). But there is also a range of
creative self-related constructs (e.g., creative self-efficacy, creative mind-sets, creative

identity) that have strongly (re)surfaced in the field in these past few years (Karwowski
& Kaufman, 2017) and certainly contribute to the greater enthusiasm toward this
methodology. These creative self-related variables, uniquely operationalized using selfreport methodology, represent relevant aspects of the creative potential because they
predict real-life creative performance or achievements (e.g., Royston & ReiterPalmon,
2017) to the same or even a greater extent than DT tasks do.
They also tap into unique aspects of the potential that other measures of creative
potential and performance (e.g., product-base assessment) cannot capture, such as
one’s own willingness and agency in creative pursuits. This point is important because if
the goal of creativity research is to bolster the fulfilment of creative potential (e.g.,
Runco, 2016), then we need to better understand what makes people turn their potential
into action and invest creative pursuits. People may have high creative potential under
the perspective of a DT task performance and other indicators of potential, but will this
potential translate into action, that is, into real-life creativity? This particular question is
rarely addressed in creativity research, and the (re)emergence of creative self-related
studies is a unique opportunity to fill this gap. This is illustrated by Karwowski, Han, &
Beghetto (2019), showing how performance on classic creative performance– based
tasks is intricately and dynamically related to people’s self-confidence in their creative
abilities.
This focus on creativity “dynamics” also resonates with Barbot’s (2019)
methodological recommendations on the study of creativity change and development,
outlining that, contrary to many other methodologies, self-report measures may better fit
the constraints of repeated-measurement designs (although they are not exempt from
their own sets of issues). Pushed to the extreme, experience sampling methods, for
which important guidelines and methodological recommendations have been outlined
by Cotter and Silvia (2019), rely quite heavily on repeated administration of self-report
items, illustrating how this methodology can help address unique questions regarding
the dynamics of creativity in more ecologically valid contexts.
In all, there are good reasons to be enthusiastic about a better valuation of selfreport methodology in creativity research, as long as self-report measures are taken for
what they are (e.g., indicators of creative self-efficacy, creative mind-set) and not
measures of creativity per se.
Conclusions: Toward New Standards in Creativity Assessment
The collection of articles in this special issue has touched upon the most critical
challenges in our field regarding creativity assessment. Together, a number of principles
and recommendations for best practices in creativity assessment can be derived. This is
a difficult exercise because the contributions in this special issue do not converge to
definitive conclusions. However, there seems to be a general consensus on the need to
adhere to some basic standards, before the field can agree on any gold standard.

Those basic standards can be summarized under the terms transparency and
homogenization of creativity assessment.
Regarding transparency of creativity assessment, the consideration is mainly on
the accuracy of defining, operationalizing, and adequately reporting on what any score
permits one to validly conclude. If there is an acceptable consensus on a general
definition of creativity, as noted throughout the special issue, virtually none of the
existing measurement approaches are a direct operationalization of that general
definition. In short, there is no such thing as “all-purpose creativity tests” (Baer, 2011, p.
312), or generic-creativity measures (Barbot, 2018c). This is not necessarily a
challenge, as long as the particular facet(s) of the creativity phenomenon being
investigated are themselves clearly defined and operationalized. It goes without saying
that the selected facet(s) and corresponding operationalization should match the
research objective and that resulting study findings should be accurately reported in
light of this operationalization. In practice, a study employing for example an alternateuses task taps into divergent production of semantic classes applied to unusual uses for
common objects, one of numerous facets and operationalization of DT (Guilford, 1984),
itself a key cognitive resource of the creative potential. Of course, it is tempting to use a
shortcut and label it a creativity task, but doing so would fail this principle of
transparency in operationalization and reporting. On a related note, selfreport measures
are not necessarily inferior to performance-based tasks such as DT at operationalizing
creativity: In a way, they are all suboptimal, in that they incompletely represent the
broader phenomenon. The point is that they are simply addressing different, but
potentially equally important, aspects of the phenomenon. Either way, relying on a
single method to measure any aspect of creativity is surely a perilous venture.
Regarding homogenization of creativity assessment, several contributions in this
special issue have emphasized how much variability there is in the actual
implementation of measures across studies and settings (e.g., variations in DT tasks,
CAT ratings, neuroscience paradigms). For the same operationalization of a given facet
of creativity (e.g., DT as a key component of creative potential), a desirable attainment
for our field is the homogenization of measures–tasks and their administration
conditions used in creativity research (e.g., instructions, time on task). This point
corresponds to Rossiter’s (2018) call for the identification of an “optimal standard
measure of each major construct.” If this endeavor is unrealistic for the general term
creativity, it is reasonably achievable at the subconstruct or facet level. Reasonably
achievable does not mean that it will be effortless. It is probably our biggest challenge
for the years to come.
Specifically, various measures of specific facets of creativity may be highly
standardized in a given study, but even modest variations across studies often shift the
substantive meaning of the scores obtained. This is illustrated by mounting evidence
from the DT research line (Reiter-Palmon, Forthmann, & Barbot, 2019) showing
variations in performance relative to instructions, time on task, or stimulus used. These

differences inform to some extent the nature of the underlying facet of creativity being
measured. Work that precisely investigates the optimal conditions to elicit this facet
(e.g., are DT tasks better under a 2-min, 10-min, or self-paced format?) are critical for
the field if their ultimate outcome is the formalization of a definite task or procedure
format that can be used broadly.
These efforts are necessary to reach, more generally, the research standards
that the field of psychology is seeking to meet, in particular with respect to replication
(cf. PACA’ special section “Replications in Psychology,” Plucker, 2014). Follow-up
questions regarding creativity assessment issues include whether the creativity
research community can reach an acceptable consensus on the optimal assessment
methods, how they will be determined, and which mechanisms can be used to establish
a homogeneous use of these methods. Determining the best format and methods
should undoubtedly be evidencedbased, but creativity researchers will still have to “be
creative” to settle on the answers to the other questions. Our era of open-science,
participatory mechanisms, and online assessment provides all the tools we need to
achieve these goals. Initiatives such as the International Personality Item Pool (e.g.,
Goldberg et al., 2006) or the Cognitive Atlas (Poldrack et al., 2011) have tackled similar
issues that we are currently facing. These initiatives could fundamentally inspire future
development in creativity assessment, and it is our hope that this special issue will
stimulate research efforts and discussion in this direction.
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